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TORT LAW AS A COMPARATIVE 
INSTITUTION: REPLY TO PERRY 
CLAIRE FINKELSTEIN* 
I. MoDELS oF ToRT LAw 
Tort theorists have been led by similarities between tort law 
and other areas of the law to explain the duty to compensate 
tort victims in terms of principles that help make sense of other 
legal ins titutions .  Some treat the duty to compensate as the 
product of a hypothetical bargain between an injurer and a vic­
tim, thus assimilating tort law to contract law. 1 Others see the 
duty to compensate as a sanction for misconduct, thus assimi­
lating tort law to criminal law. The "contract" theorists adopt 
an economic model of tort law,2 while the "criminal" law theo­
rists view tort law primarily as a moral institution.  3 
The economic and the moral models both have a certain 
plausibility. That this is so reflects a tension in our intuitions 
about tort liability. The tension emerges in one class of cases in 
particular, the class in which the degree of the injurer 's  wrong­
doing and the amount of the victim's  loss diverge . The ques-
" J.D. candidate, Yale Law School, 1993; Ph.D candidate, University o f  Pittsburgh, 
Philosophy Department. I wish to thank Kurt Baier, Jules Coleman, and Stephen Macy 
for their helpful criticism and comments. 
I. In the Calabresi-Melamed framework, for example, liability rules provide com­
pensation for an involuntary transfer of entitlements when high transaction costs make 
voluntary transfer according to property rules infeasible. Liability rules are thus used to 
compensate accident victims because transaction costs prohibit allocating the cost of 
accidents in advance by contractual agreement among drivers. Tort rules, which allo­
cate the cost of accidents ex post, can be thought of as effectuating the contract the 
parties would have agreed to were transaction costs not prohibitive. See Guido Cala­
bresi and Douglas Melamed, Propn·ty Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1108-10 (1972). 
2. Richard Posner provides the best example of the former approach. See Richard A. 
Posner, The Concept of Corrective justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, I 0 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 
(1981) [hereinafter, Posner, Corrective justice]; Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I 
J. LEGAL STuD. 29 (1972); see also Gu iDo CALABRESI, THE CosT OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
3. Ernest Weinrib provides the best example of the latter approach. See Ernest 
Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Pr1vate Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1283 (1989); Ernest 
Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 407 (1987); Ernest Weinrib, 
Law as a Kant/an Idea of Reason, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 472 (1987). This divis!on in the 
literature between economic and moral theorists is, in effect, a division between utilita­
rian and fairness-based approaches. See Posner, Conectwe justice, supra note 2. Although 
all economic approaches are utilitarian, however, and most utilitarian approaches are 
economic, not all fairness-based approaches regard tort law as imposing moral 
sanctions. 
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tion in these cases is whether the duty to compensate should be 
tied to the degree of wrongdoing or to the amount of loss. 
The economic model is implicitly committed to tying the 
duty to compensate to loss. The attention to loss is a by-prod­
uct of the way in which economic analysis conceives the point 
of tort law, namely, to create incentives for efficient behavior. 
Tort law, according to this model, encourages efficiency by set­
ting the price of an involuntary transfer ex post at the price that 
will ensure that only efficient transactions take place. That price 
is the amount of the victim's loss.4 On the moral model, by con­
trast, the duty to compensate is tied (via the notion of correc­
tive justice) to wrongful conduct. The wrongfulness of an act is 
a function of the intention, broadly speaking, with which it is 
performed.5 Therefore the moral model ties the duty to com­
pensate to the injurer's intentions. Liability rules, on this view, 
are a form of punishment, and there is a general principle that 
it is unfair to punish agents for unintended consequences.6 
In its emphasis on loss, economic analysis captures a central 
feature of tort law. But it captures this feature at a price: It can­
not explain the ways in which an injurer's state of mind is also 
an integral part of the institution. The moral model, on the 
other hand, has difficulty explaining why we require injurers to 
compensate for the full degree of loss in situations where the 
extent of the loss was neither intended nor foreseen. Thus, 
4. Selling the ex post cost at an amount equal lO the victim's loss will generate �he 
Jesirecl result, because the injurer •,vill only choose to engage in transactions in which 
her gain is greater than her liability. Any transaction in which the injurer's gain exceeds 
the victim's loss is an efficient one. and any transaction in which the victim's lo:ss ex­
ceeds the injurer's gain is inefficient. If the injurer must compensate the victim for the 
full amount of the loss, then the ir�jurer will only engage in efficient transactions. This 
analysis, however, assumes a probability of detection of l. Where the probability of 
detection is less than J. econccnic analysis provides that the cost to the irJurer should 
be somewhat higher than the victim's loss. See juLES L. CoLEMAN. C1imes, Kickers and 
Transaction Stmcturrs, in 1\L-\RKETS, Mmt.-u.s, AND THE LAW ( 1988). 
5. Recklessness is arguabiy a species of intention, because the reckless actor is aware 
of the risk when she acts. i'i.�gligence, where the risk is not, even if knowable, known, is 
more tenuously connected with intention. A.rguably negligent conduct is not inten­
tional and therefore not "wrongful," in the full mora! sense of the term. Consistent 
with distinguishing recklessness and negligence in this way is the fact that negligence is 
rarely a sufficient mens , .. ea for c:-iminal !iabilitv. 
6. !\fora! theories of corrective justice are. bv their own lights, insufficient to co\·e;­
the range of cases in which liability is imposed in tort. There are thus two possible 
directions such theories can take. First, they can :;ay corrective justice is a moral notion, 
but that not all cases in tort fali within the domain of cc:rrective justice. Second, they 
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while each of these models is able to explain certain elements 
of tort law, neither can explain the practice as a whole. 
In Risks and Wrongs,7 Jules Coleman presents a solution to 
this problem-his "mixed conception" of corrective justice. 
The mixed conception attempts to explain why injurers must 
compensate for loss, without ignoring the role played by the 
concept of responsibility and the intentional states that are cen­
tral to it. Coleman properly regards tort law as a hybrid institu­
tion of sorts, and this allows him to accommodate our 
conflicting intuitions in this area. But the hybrid is not simply a 
combination of the economic and the moral models, for Cole­
man rejects both. The mixed conception justifies the focus on 
loss for ethical reasons, rather than for the utilitarian reasons 
of economic analysis. And it rejects tradition2' .. oral justifica­
tions for focusing on states of mind, like the Tt:Lributivist argu­
ments the "criminal law" theorists have advanced.8 
In this article, I consider a criticism of Coleman's mixed con­
ception made by S tephen Perry.9 Perry argues that because the 
duty to compensate arises for reasons that are independent of 
the nature of the injurer's conduct, injurers are strictly liable, 
on the mixed conception, for all the (sufficiently proximate) 
outcomes of their voluntary acts. Perry proposes a modification 
of the mixed conception-the incorporation of a fault require­
ment. While agreeing with Perry on the nature of the problem, 
I wish to take issue with his proposed solution. 
I argue that incorporating a fault requirement makes unavail­
able any plausible account of necessity cases. Necessity cases in 
tort are difficult to explain precisely because injurers are held 
liable for the losses they engender, despite the fact that they 
are not at fault. The treatment of necessity cases in tort is pecu­
liar to that institution; a necessity justification is exonerating, 
:for example, in criminal law, while liability is not avoided in 
7, juLES L. CoLEMAN, RisKs AND WRoNGS (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript dated 
May !, 1992, on file with author; pages cited to manuscript), 
8. See Weinrib, Law as a Karztwn Idea of Reason, supra note 3, at 499 ("The require­
ment of right that every act of wrongdoing be answered by an equal and opposite reac­
tion has a .. , retributive aspect."); Sff aLw \.V<Cinrib. R1ght and Advantage Iii Pri;•ale Law, 
sujmz note 3: Ernest Weinrib, The Special .\iomhty of Tort La'''· 34 lV!cGILL LJ 403 
( 1989), Ernest Weinrib, Toward a .\!oral of Xegligence Law, 2 Lo,;,v & PHIL 37 
(1983). 
9. See Stephen Perry, The .\1/xed Conaptum of Conm'i<'f Jwtirr, 15 H:..Rv. JL. & PuB. 
PoL'Y 917 (!992). 
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tort. 10 It i s  important to focus on necessity cases , rather than 
dismissing them as aberrations, because in them the distinctive 
nature of tort law stands in relief. Necessity cases teach that a 
fault requirement is  at home in the criminal law but not in tort. 
For this reason, I argue, Perry's  suggestion adheres to a model 
of tort liability that brings the duty to pay compensation in tort 
too close to the criminal s anction . 1 1 
In  the latter part of the paper, I attempt to provide Coleman 
with a solution to the problem Perry presents . My proposed 
solution is intended to be in the spirit of much of Perry's  work. 
It is also intended to preserve the sense in Coleman's  work that 
duties in corrective justice are dictated neither by  principles of 
efficiency, nor by general moral concerns .  The account I pres­
ent takes as its point of departure the idea, which Perry dis­
cusses throughout his writings , that tort law is  a comparative 
institution . 1 2  It is this feature, I believe, that distinguishes the 
duty to compensate in tort most sharply from the duties im­
posed by the two legal institutions that flank it. 
I I .  THE MixED CoNCEPTION 
The mixed conception is so-named because it is a mix of 
Coleman's old view, "the annulment conception, " 1 3  and an­
other view of corrective justice, the "relational view. " 1 4  Ac­
cording to the annulment conception, corrective justice 
requires that "wrongful (or unjust) gains and losses be recti­
fied ,  eliminated, or annulled . " 15 Injurers should be stripped of 
any wrongful gains and victims compensated for any wrongful 
losses. The conception derives its plausibility from the para-
10. See MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
ll. I do not in fact regard conventional moral models as particularly well-suited to 
explain criminal law either. But if such models are plausible at all, it is surely because 
they help to explain the practice of moral condemnation that is implicit in punishment. 
12. The account I offer here attempts to follow Perry's lead, but to carry the idea 
farther than Perry has carried it. See Stephen Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 7 7  
IowA L .  REv. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript a t  84, o n  file with author); Perry, 5Upra 
note 9, at 936-38; Stephen Perry, Comment on Coleman: Corrective Justice, 67 IND L.J. 381 
(forthcoming 1992) (manuscript on file with author). Other writers have also referred 
to tort law as a comparative institution, but few have attempted to develop the insight 
in any depth. See. e.g., Richard Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Stncl 
Liability, 3]. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974). 
13. For a detailed defense of the annulment conceptio11, see juLES L. CoLEMAN, Cor­
rective Justice and Wrongful Gain, in MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE L\W (1988). 
14. See sources cited supra notes 3, 9.  
15. Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Conectlve Justice, 67 IND. LJ. (forth­
coming 1992) (manuscript at I 0, on file with author). 
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digm of certain kinds of intentional torts . For example, in the 
case in which the injurer converts the victim's  chattel ,  correc­
tive justice requires that the property be taken away from the 
injurer and returned to the victim. The injurer's wrongful gain 
and the victim's wrongful loss are both eliminated by the return 
of the chattel because the gain and the loss are both equal to 
the value of the chattel. 
When the injurer's gain is not equal to the victim's loss ,  how­
ever, the view is  problematic .  Suppose the injurer' s  gain is  less 
than her victim's loss .  It would be unfair, according to the an­
nulment thesis , to make the injurer compensate the victim for 
the ful l  amount of the loss because that would impose a wrong­
ful loss on the injurer with respect to any amount she is  re­
quired to pay that exceeds the amount of her gain . But to allow 
her to pay the victim an amount equal only to her gain would 
also be unfair because this would undercompensate the victim. 
One solution to this problem is to set up a public fund, a sort 
of social insurance scheme. 16 The injurer could be required to 
pay into the fund in the amount of her gain , and the victim 
could be paid out of the fund to the full extent of his los s .  17 To 
extend the thesis to other sorts of cases,  both intentional and 
non-intentional torts, we need only suppose that an inj urer 
gains when she commits a wrong. Thus the commission of a 
battery would be considered a " gain" of some sort to an in­
jurer, and the failure to take due care 1ikewise . 18 An injurer 
16. In his earlier writings, Coleman seems to have suggested that such a scheme 
would b e  compatible with, but was not required by, the annulment thes is. He held the 
view that corrective justice merely provides "the foundation of a claim that a person 
has suffered a compensable loss, or that he has secured an unj us t  gain, "  Coleman, supra 
note 13, at ! 87, and not the mode of rectification, namely "the manr:er in which unj ust  
gains and l osses are to be eliminated." /d. But I think this is  false if  one holds true to 
the annulment conception. Given that many cases will be ones in which gains and 
losses are not equivalent, a mode of rectification that provides for unequal a mounts of 
payment and recovery is mandatory. The s ocial insurance scheme, or some comparable 
syste m ,  is not only compatible with corrective justice on the annulment conception, it is 
mandated by it. 
An alternative approach, which Coleman adopted at var-ious points, is to say that 
corrective j ustice applies only to those cases in which gains and los ses are equal. See id. 
Other principles must  account for duties in other sorts of cases .  But this sol ution makes 
corrective justice a principle too narrow to be interesting, as  Coleman has since recog­
nized. He now concedes that corrective justice s hould specify the mode, as ·.vel! as the 
grounds , of liability and recovery. See CoLEMAN, supra note 7, at 500. 
17. As a practical matter, the fund might not be self-sus taining, and the d ifference 
might have to be made up from general tax coffers. 
18. The annulment concep tion m us t  thus make use of two principles borrowed fi-om 
economic analysis. Where intentional torts are concerned , the fact that committing a 
battery unobs tructed is worth something to someone intent on ba ttering means that a 
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could be required to pay whether or not her conduct had re­
sulted in a loss because the duty to pay would be tied to wrong­
doing, rather than to loss .  To put the point in terms of a 
distinction Coleman has viewed as fundamental th roughout his 
work, the "grounds of liability" would be distinc t  from the 
"grounds of recovery."1 9  That is , we would assess whether an 
injurer should be held liable separately from whether a victim 
can recover. 
This solution, however, reveals a deeper problem. The an­
nulment conception holds that wrongful gains and losses ought 
to be annulled; it is apparently indifferent as to who annuls 
them. The injurer's duty to repair a loss thus does not appear 
to be stronger than anyone else's duty to repair it. As Coleman 
himself says, "the annulment view appears to hold that justice 
requires that a certain state of the world be brought about, not 
that anyone in particular has a special reason in jus tice for 
bringing it about. "20 
The problem, as Coleman notes , is that this is precisely the 
way we think of distributive justice.21 The central characteristic 
of distributive justice is that it provides society as a whole with 
reasons for acting.  We tend to think of corrective justice, by 
contrast, as giving individuals reasons for acting. Correc tive jus­
tice imposes on an agent who has behaved in a certain way,  in 
virtue of the fact that she has behaved in that way, a reason for 
doing something-a reason that is unique to her. The annul­
ment thesis thus effaces this difference beHveen distributive 
and corrective justice. 
The point can be made in terms of the familiar distinction 
ben.veen agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons for acting. 2  
Agent-neutral reasons are reasons that "can be given a general 
form which does not include an essential reference to the per­
son who has it, "23 that is, a reference to the person whose rea­
son it is. The fact that some act would reduce the amount o:f 
--- · ------·---------------
batterer is enriched when he commits a bactery. iNhere negligence is concerned, some­
one who does not take reasonable care incurs a gain because she saves lhe cost of 
taking precautions. See Posner, Corrective Justice, sufJm note 2, at 198. 
19. Col eman. supra note 13: COLEMAN, mpra note 7, at 391. 
20. CoLEMAN, supra note 7, at 422. 
21. See /d. 
'22. See Perry, Comment on Coleman, supra note l:?., <>t 390. The distinction is Derel:. 
Parfit's. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 143 (1984); see also THor-lAS l'-L�GEL, 
THE VrEW FRoM NowHERE 152-53 (1986). 
23. NAGEL, supra note 22, at !52. 
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suffering in the world is an agent-neutral reason for acting. By 
contrast, ag·ent-relative reasons do refer to the nerson whose 
c • 
reason it is. The fact that acting in a certain way is in my inter-
est is an agent-relative reason because the description under 
which the relevant consideration is a reason makes essential 
reference to me. One important difference between distributive 
and corrective justice, then, is that the former creates agent­
neutral reasons for acting, whereas the reasons created by the 
latter are agent-relative. The problem with the annulment con­
ception is that the reasons it provides are agent-neutral rather 
than agent-relative; it cannot, therefore, provide a satisfactory 
account of corrective justice. The relational view, by contrast, 
does capture the agent-relative character of corrective justice. 
According to the relational view, the fact that the injurer is 
morally responsible for wronging the victim creates a duty in 
the injurer to repair the wrong. The duty arises out of the in­
jurer-victim relationship. As Ernest Weinrib maintains, "[t]he 
bond between plaintiff and defendant is the fruition in the 
plaintiff of the potential for injury contained in the wrongful­
ness of the defendant's action."24 That the injurer has wronged 
the victim thus creates agent-relative reasons for the injurer to 
act. 25 
The relational view, however, meets the condition of provid­
ing agent-relative reasons at the cost of being unable to explain 
why the wrong can only be repaired if compensation is paid to 
the victim. If the point of compensation, on this view, is to re­
pair the wrong in the injurer, it would seem to be a matter of 
indifference whether the money is paid to 
someone else, or even whether the ·wTong is 
compensation or punishment.26 
l • . tne VKtlrn or to 
. l ' 1 rep;:nrec! througn 
But even if the reiational view can cure this more radical de­
fect, by showing that the wrong ca.n only be repaired in the in-
. ·r l · • • 
1 · h · h 1 ' JUrer n tne vJCtJm IS compensatea, H s ares w1t. tne annulment 
conception the inability to bridge wrongdoing and loss. The 
result is that like the annulment conception, the relational view· 
2ct. Weinrib, Causa/io11 and Wrongdcing, supm note 3, at 440. 
:25. See ·C:oLErvL-\!-.i, !iUjJra no�.e 7: at 4�7. 
�?.6. \Veinrib denies this: "The proce:;s of rectificatio11 . . . rnirrors the pr()ces� uf 
wrongfL!i injury. just as the connection of tortfeasor 2nd victim is essential to the 
lATongfu!ncss of the loss .  so this connection is essential to the \vay that tort lav�' annuls 
this '-•Tongful loss.·· V/einrib, Causatio.'l and it'rongdmng, supra note 3, at 434. It is not 
clear, ho\,·e-�·:� r. 'shy on the relational vie·w this should be so. 
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cannot explain why i t  is fair to require an injurer to compensate 
her victim for the full amount of the loss in the case  in which 
the injurer's wrongdoing (or gain) is less than the victim's loss. 
Similarly, it cannot explain why an injurer should not be re­
quired to pay more than a victim's loss where the wrongdoing 
is greater than the loss. As Coleman points out ,  the relational 
view holds that " it is the wrong, not the loss that must be an­
nulled . . . .  "27 If the duty to repair stems from the wrong, the 
theory cannot explain why any loss on the victim's part in ex­
cess of the wrong should be the i�urer's responsibility. 
The annulment conception, like the economic account, cap­
tures the importance of loss to the notion of corrective justice, 
but it  fails to capture its agent-relative character. The relational 
view captures the agent-relative nature of corrective justice,  but 
it focuses on wrongdoing rather than loss. The mixed concep­
tion combines these theories to give expression to the idea that 
corrective justice provides an injurer with agent-relative rea­
sons to repair a victim's loss. Coleman states the mixed concep­
tion thus: " Corrective justice imposes on wrongdoers the duty 
to repair their wrongs and the wrongful losses their wrongdo­
ing occasions .. . .  [T]he duty of wrongdoers in corrective jus­
tice is to repair the wrongful losses for which they are 
responsible. "28 
The mixed conception rests on two criteria:29 (1) agency, 
which requires that the victim's loss stem from an exercise of 
the injurer ' s causal powers ; and (2) wrongful loss .  A loss is 
wrongful when it is the result of either a wrong or wrongdoing. 
A wrong is any action contrary to a right, whether a permissible 
invasion-in which case it is an infringement-or an impermis­
sible invasion-in which case it is a violation.30 VVrongdoing is 
impermissible or uniustifiable conduct that results in harm, 
• J 
where harm is a setback to a legitimate interest. 31 (Illegitimate 
interests, in this taxonomy, cannot be harmed .) 1 shaii consider 
these conditions in reverse order. 
27. CoLEMAN, supra note 7, a t  427. 
28. !d. at 436. 
29. I follow Perry's apt characterization of the mixed conception. See Perry, supra 
note 9, at 920-23. 
30. See CoLEMAN, supra note 7, at 382, 407; sa aL10 juDITH THo:v�sot-:, Self D1jense and 
R1ghts, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK (i 986) (to whom the distinction is attributed). 
31. See CoLEMAN, supra note 7, at 451-54. 
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The dis tinction between a wrong and wrongdoing implicit in 
the second requirement is meant to accommodate necessity 
cases .  Coleman gives the example of Hal and Carla, who are 
both diabetics . Hal takes some of Carla's insulin when she is 
not home to give her permission , in order to prevent himself 
from slipping into a coma. It would seem Hal had ajustification 
for taking Carla's property without her consent. The question 
is why Hal must compensate Carla if he had a validjustification. 
Put the other way around, if the duty to pay s tems from the fact 
that Carla's right to exclude has been violated,  how could Hal's 
conduct have been justified? 
As noted above, wrongs encompass both violations and in­
fringements of rights . Here, the argument goes,  Carla's right 
has not been violated; it has merely been infringed. Hal's duty 
to compensate Carla s tems from the fact that Hal's behavior is 
contrary to her right, the fact that it merely infringed her right 
(because he has a justification) notwithstanding. 
Reminiscent of the dis tinction between the "grounds of lia­
bility " and the "grounds of recovery , " Coleman's  solution de­
pends on the idea that "a victim's claim to repair for loss can be 
independent of the moral character of the injurer's conduct . "32 
Hal's conduct is justified by his necessi tous s tate. Carla has a 
right to compensation because her right to exclude has been 
infringed. Carla 's claim is thus "independent of whatever over­
all moral assessment of [Hal's] conduct we come to . "33 
This solution t o  necessity cases, however, cannot be main­
tained.  Its weakness is best revealed by considering the criti­
cism Perry makes of the wrongful loss requirement and what is 
required to rebut that criticism. Perry 's criticism is that it allows 
the following case.34 Two individuals, A and B, both contribute 
causally to a harm suffered by C. Suppose that A's action, and 
A's alone, consti tutes a wrong or wrongdoing. This would ap­
pear to be sufficient to make C 's loss wrongful. Because A bears 
the requisite agency -relation to C 's loss , A is responsible in cor­
rective justice to repair that loss. The problem is that B also 
satisfies the agency condition. And because C 's loss is wrong-
32. Jd. at 406. 
3 3. !d. at 408. 
34. See Pern', supra note 9. at 922-23. 
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ful, i t  would seem that B also has a duty i n  corrective j ustice to 
make good C ' s  loss . But this canno t  be right, b ecause B did no 
wrong.  Corrective j u s tice should not implicate B .  
The problem , Perry points out,  s tems from the fac t  that 
Coleman posits an independent category of wrongful  loss-in­
dependent, that is ,  of features o f  the injurer' s  conduc t . 35  VVe 
have already n o ted that the s eparate category is  required to ex­
plain neces sity cas e s . 36 If the duty to compensate were too 
tightly tied to the nature of the inj urer' s conduct,  i t  would n o t  
be p ossible for " an iPJ urer' s  claim to repair for l o s s  [to] b e  in­
dependent of the moral character of the inj urer' s conduct . " 37 
But,  Perry in effect argues ,  in the effort to s olve necessity cases ,  
C oleman has  distorted the account he gives o f  n on-necessity 
cases . 
Perry sugges ts that the wrongful loss requirement be 
changed to a fault  requirement: An inj urer 's  conduct must be 
faulty before she can have duties in corrective j u s tice . 38 This 
modification would take care of Perry' s  counter-example be­
cause A alone was at faul t .  But the change exposes Perry to the 
difficulty with necessity cases that C oleman ' s  independent cate­
gory of wrongful loss was designed to overcome. It would s eem 
that Hal should n o t  have to compensate Carla, on Perry ' s  view, 
because he was not  at fault .  Recognizing thi s ,  Perry presents a 
different account o f  neces si ty cases . 
Perry thinks that " the crucial point s eems to be that Hal inten­
tionally took the insulin . " 39 He says that " our intuition that 
compensation is owed seems to be clearly tied to the in ten­
tional nature of Hal's  act. "-10 His s olution is that the deliberate 
nature o f  the act m akes Hal ' s  behavior "fcmlt-like, if n o t  exactly 
faulty . "4 1  It  is " faul t-likenes s , "  then , that grounds the duty to 
repair in these cases, according to Perry . 
There are at least three problems with this s olution.  Firs t ,  
. h " C  l l " k  " ' . 1 
. 
as summg L at rau t- 1 eness can be g1ven a oear meanm g, 
3 5 .  S a  id. a t  923 ,  925.  
36.  See SU/Jra t e x t  accompanying notes 32-34.  
37.  CoLEMAN, supra note 7.  a t  406.  
3 8 .  Perry, s!lpra n o t e  9, a t  929; see also Perry. The .\lora! _Foundations of Tort Law, 5upra 
n o t e  1 2 , at 69. 
39 .  Perry, supra n o t e  9 ,  a t  <.J 2 9 .  
4 0 .  !d . 
.f 1 .  !d. ; se!' also Perrv, Comment on Colema n ,  supm note 1 2 . at 'i03.  Srf gcneml!y Perry, The 
.\ Jomi Fc•undn !IUiiS of Tort Law , supra n o t e  ! 2 , a t  8 3 -8 7 .  
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the intuition that it is the intentional nature of the taking that 
jus tifies the duty to compensate seems problematic. Perry 
surely does not mean to say that taking the insulin intentionally 
is what is relevant. That would seem to imply that intentional 
conduct is per se fault-like, which would include most of human 
behavior. He must therefore mean that intentionally taking the 
insulin of another without pennission is what is relevant. But it 
would seem to be the fact that Hal took the insulin without per­
mission simpliciter that is relevant, rather than that he did so in­
tentionally. Suppose Hal were a guest in Carla ' s  house, and in a 
state of desperation, he used the first vial of insulin he saw, 
without pausing to determine its ownership . It seems he would 
still have a duty to compensate Carla, despite the fact that he 
was merely reckless  or negligent with respect to ownership . At 
the very least, then the notion of fault-likeness will have to in­
clude reckless ,  and perhaps negligent, behavior. 
Second, Perry's solution to necessity cases will make it diffi­
cult for him to give a suitable account of self-defense cases. Ac­
cording to Perry 's solution, it would seem that the behavior of 
one who acts in self-defense is "fault-like, " because it is inten­
tional. And if the behavior is fault-like,  the agent acting in self­
defense should be held liable for injuries she inflicts . This 
would be a revisionary treatment of self-defense, to say the 
least .  
Third , Hal's conduct is either justified or i t  is not. If justified, 
it is not anything like faulty . On the contrary , at least in this 
context, to say that conduct is justified means more than that 
the behavior in question is tolerated , but preferably not en­
gaged in . If Hal were truly in a state of necessity , we would 
surely prefer that he take Carla 's  insulin than that he let himself 
slip quietly into a coma.42 
That conduct is justified should mean not only that there is 
no "fault in the doer, "43 as Coleman puts it, or no character 
defect .  It should also mean that there is no "fault in the do­
ing, "44 that is , that the conduct in question cannot be criticized . 
42. To say ihat conduct is "j ustified" in ordinary language may n o t  always mean that  
the conduct is preferred ,  but in the semi- technical sense employed in the legal context ,  
that  is  the connota t i o n .  
43.  CoLEMAN,  supra note 7,  a t  290-9 1 .  
4 4 .  M 
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That is what it means for an agent to have a justification,  not 
s imply that she does not have a bad character. 
Perry supposes that justifications speak to fault-in-the-doer, 
and that a justified, but otherwise faulty, action remains a fault­
in-the-doing.45 He therefore thinks of necessity cases as ones in 
which there is no fault in the agent, but that fault remains in the 
action .46 But surely it makes no sense to predicate a moral qual­
ity, such as fault , of actions, construed l iterally .  Fault-whether 
" in the doing" or " in the doer"-is predicated of people . 
Judgments about the ethical qualities of action are connected 
to the way we value different modes of l ife. They are a species 
of what Charles Taylor calls " s trong evaluation, "  namely, eval­
uation of qualities of human motivation .4 7  We can dis tinguish 
between two kinds of s trong evaluation: evaluation of an agent 
for more or less permanent features of her character and evalu­
ation of an agent for immediate s tates of intention or motiva­
tion . A judgment of fault results in the ascription of fault-in­
the-doer in the former case; fault-in-the-doing applies in the 
latter. To say something is  a fault-in-the-doing but not a fault­
in-the-doer, then, i s  s imply to say that i t  is a fault in an agent 
that is not attributable to her character. I t  i s  to say that 
although the actor is at fault ,  we cannot use the quality of the 
action to make generalizations about her. To say that some 
otherwise faulty piece of behavior is  justified, therefore, is to 
say that the agent is not at fault in any respect, neither "in the 
doing" nor "in the doer ."  
Perry 's solution thus assumes away, rather than solves , the 
problem. He simply posits fault-against  the intuition that 
there is  none-in order to ground a duty to compensate.  I t  is 
the intuition that there is no fault in this case, however, that 
4 5 .  See Perry , supra note 9, a t  929-30.  C oleman also takes th is  view. See COLEMA N ,  
supra note 7 ,  a t  290-9 1 .  
4 6 .  Coleman says :  "When a n  i ndividual acts,  we can dis t inguish two aspeCLs of the 
s i tuation that might be at fau l t .  On the one hand, the action may b e  a t  fau l t ;  o n  the 
other,  the actor may be at fau l t  . . . . " CoLEMAN, supra note 7, a t  290-9 ! .  
4 7 .  CHARLES TAYLOR, !!" hat is Human .-i.gency t, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS VoL. I ,  
HuM.-\N AGENCY .-\ND LANGUAGE ( 1 985 ) .  Taylor contrasts s trong evaluation with  weak 
evaluation, w h ich is  concerned p ri marily with o u tcomes . An example o f  the latter is  
when if. trving to decide between having chocolate o r  vanil la  ice crea m ,  I eva l uate the 
merits of each directly. I do not consider the worth of mv preference for one versus  the 
wort h of my preference for the o ther.  I s imply  consider the s trength o f  m y  preference 
in each case. and thus engage in what is  primarily a qua ntitative, rather than qualitative,  
analYsis .  Ser id.  at 16. 
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generates the problem, and the intuition cannot be wished 
away . 
The substi tution of a fault requirement for Coleman' s  
wrongful loss requirement is not  a satisfactory solution to  the 
problem with the mixed conception that Perry signals .  Intui­
tively this should seem obvious if we take necessi ty cases seri­
ously: The fact that there is a duty to compensate in necessity 
cases in tort determines that fault cannot be a condition of cor­
rective justice, assuming corrective justice is  understood to be  
the  organizing principle of  tort law. 
In the next section I discuss Perry's  treatment of the other 
element of the mixed conception ,  the agency requirement, and 
I explain why Perry's  interpretation of this requirement is 
largely correct. After considering Perry' s  account in greater de­
tail in Section Five,  in Section Six I propose an alternative 
modification of Coleman's wrongful loss requirement, one that 
does not make fault a necessary condition of liability in correc­
tive justice. 
IV. THE AGENCY REQUIREMENT 
Perry proposes that the agency requirement be understood 
not as a general causal condition, but rather in terms of what 
A.M.  Honore refers to as "outcome responsibility . "48 Outcome 
responsibility is quite a general conception of responsibility ,  
the reach of which is much broader than is the reach of "re­
sponsibility" in ordinary language . Perry says : 
There i s ,  1 wish to argue, a sense in which we are responsible 
for all  the (sufficiently proximate) outcomes of our action s ,  
regardless o f  whether vve were at fault  i n  bringing them 
about.  This conception of responsibili ty,  ·which Tony Ho­
non� has called outcome-responsibility, involves an element 
o f  moral luck. We can b·': res ponsible in a non-culpable sense 
for outcomes that we [did] not intend or foresee because the 
fact of having made a difference in the world, through a vol­
u n tary exercise of volit ion,  i s  i tself of normative 
s i gnificance .49 
Outcome responsibility limits responsibility based on causation 
to the sufficiently proximate cons equences of vo luntary actions . 
"Sufficiently proximate" is most reasonably cons trued as a 
4 8 .  See A . M .  Honore. RespiJnsibi/ity and Luck. ! 04 LAw Q. REv. 530 ( 1 988) . 
49 .  Perrv, supra note 9. at 935 (c i tat ion om itted ) .  
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foreseeability conditio n . 50 Thus I am (outcome) resp o n s ible for 
the effects I could have been expected to foresee,  whether I 
foresaw them or not .  I merely cause,  but am not  (outcome) re­
sponsible for, effects that are not reasonably foreseeable.  
It  is  easy to see why outcome responsibility i s  preferable to a 
mere causal requirement . Suppose the second condition were a 
fault condition, as Perry sugges ts . 5 1  If the first condition were a 
causal condition without more, an agent would b e  responsible 
for all the effects of her faulty behavior, no matter how unlikely 
and, depending on one's  view of causation,  no m atter how re­
mote in time. There is  a need, then , for a causal condition that 
limits responsibility more sharply than does a simple causal 
requirement . 52 
Could the agency requirement b e  even more res trictive than 
the notion of outcome responsibility ? Coleman himself appears 
to regard the firs t condition as a ful l  responsibility condition, 
that i s ,  a condition that res tricts the field more, rather than less , 
than outcome responsibility would.  He indicates the intended 
equivalence of the " agency" requirement and "responsibility" 
by saying that "an individual has a duty to repair those wrong­
ful losses that are his responsibility . " 5 3  An injurer (D) is  re­
sponsible for a victim's  (P's)  wrongful loss only if P's loss is D ' s  
faul t . 54 The sentence " P ' s  l o s s  is D ' s  fault" i s  true when: l )  D is 
at fault ,  2) the aspect under which D ' s  conduct i s  faulty is caus­
ally connected in the appropriate way to P's  loss, and 3) P's loss 
is within the s cope of the risk that makes D's  conduct at fault .  55 
Spelling out the theory of responsibility in this  way effec­
tively incorporates the fault requirement that Perry thinks is 
missing from the second condition--the wrongful loss require-
50. As Perry notes elsewhere, the legal analogue of " sufficien t l y  proximate " '  is  
"proximate cause , "  and this  h as been primarily understood to cover c o nsequences of 
volun tary actions that are reasonably foreseeable .  See Perry, The :\Ioral Foundations of 
Tor/ Law. supra note 1 2 ,  at 8 1 .  I therefore believe that Perry misstates the  argument 
when h e  says in the above-quo ted passage that o u tcome responsibi l i ty i ncludes c o n s e ­
quences that an agent " could not  intend or foresee, " '  Perry, supra note 9, at 935, and I 
have al tered the passage accordingly. 
5 ! .  See supra text accompanyin g  notes 38- 4 1 .  
52 .  Of course causatio n ,  under any in terpretation, is not  simple. Here I have in mind 
roughly a " b u t  for" test .  The general point that the ems;:] requirement sh()u]d con!.ain 
a "reasonably foreseeable" component,  howeve:,  i s  sufficiently clear wi th>ut  having tc) 
specify the exact nature of the underlying account of causation . 
5 3 .  CoLEM.·\N ,  supra note 7 ,  at 468 . 
5 4 .  See 1d. 
55. See id. a t  468-69.  
f 
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ment-into the firs t condition-the agency requirement .  The 
problem, as we saw above,56 is that this will  dep rive C oleman of 
the solution he presents to neces sity cases .  Hal  should not  have 
to pay once again,  on this conception of responsibility, not be­
cau s e  his  conduct is "fault-like, "  as Perry suggests ,  but because 
he is now not  responsible. 
Coleman is aware of the difficulty, and he attempts a s olu­
tion: He claims that the underlying theory of responsibility will  
vary depending o n  the type of case .57 The theory outlined 
above, he says ,  will not apply to rights-infringement cases ( i . e .  
necessity cases) "if for no other reason [than} that in  the rights in-
fringement case there is no fault in the doing. "58 But Coleman neither 
explains why the absence of fault  in the doing should alter the 
nature of the underlying theory of responsibility nor presents 
any independent jus tificatio n  for the claim that the theory of 
responsibility should vary with the case.  59 
Moreover, there are reasons why fault should be external to 
the concept of responsibility . Responsibility n ormally applies 
to b o th praiseworthy and blameworthy actions,  a result we can­
n o t  reach if to say someone is responsible means that he is  at 
fault. Second, if the fault requirement is part of  the concept of 
responsibility, we will be forced to say that s o m eone who is n o t  
at  fault is simply not  responsible for h i s  actions . In s o m e  cases 
this would not be troublesome; we s ometimes refer to agents 
acting in self-defense in this manner. In o ther cas es ,  however, 
this is  counterintuitive. It  seems wrong, for example, to say that 
an agent who chooses between the lesser of two evils is not  
rzsponsible for the outcome . If she chooses  correctly she is to be 
praised for the result ,  and this  depends on her being res ponsi­
ble for it .  To say a certain outcome was chos en presupposes the 
chooser's resDonsibility for t.hat outcome. 1 . 
Perry is right, then, to sugges t that outcome responsibility is  
the most likely candidate for the second condition.  It  i s  clear 
that the weak causal condition includes too many cases in the 
scope of corrective justice, and that fault-based respo nsibil ity 
-vvill either include too few or require that we make the unlikely 
5 6 .  See supra t e x t  accornpanying n o t e s  38- 4 7.  
57. See COLEMAN,  supra n o t e  7,  a t  470.  
58 .  id. (emphasis in original ) .  
5 9 .  He also does n o t  at t<::mpt t o  indicate what t h e  proper theory of responsibi l i ty  is 
in s uch cases . 
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assumption that the underlying concept of responsibility varies 
with the case .  
V. PERRY's  Two STAGES 
I now wish to explore Perry ' s  account of corrective justice in 
greater detail. Perry's account also consists of two elements,  or 
stages of inquiry . At the first s tage, outcome responsibility 
serves to identify the relevant class of individuals about whom 
the question of fault can be raised.  Only agents who are out­
come responsible for a victim' s  loss are candidates for duties in 
corrective justice . 
Although the first s tage does not settle the question of liabil­
ity, i t  is  not entirely neutral from a normative perspective . The 
inquiry is thus a moral one because Perry thinks of loss  itself as 
a morally significant category, and the firs t  s tage measures 
whether an agent has been responsible for a loss .  "A person 
who is outcome-responsible for a loss has a normatively s ignifi­
cant connection with i t  that is  capable of affecting her subse­
quent reasons for action.  "60 He says elsewhere that 
" [s ]omeone who is outcome-responsible for having harmed an­
other has a special responsibility with respect to the loss ,  be­
cause there is a sense in which it is her loss . . . .  "6 1  It is  because 
Perry regards loss  itself as having normative s ignificance that 
he gives responsibility the broad definition he does .  Perry 
wishes the term "responsibility , "  with all of its normative con­
notations , to cover the full range of reasonably foreseeable 
losses . 
The first s tage thus establishes whether there is  faul t-in-the­
doing. But fault-in-the-doer is apparently required for liability 
under Perry' s  scheme. Thus the inquiry at the s econd s tage 
shifts to the doer. 
The question at the second s tage is thi s :  \'\Tho from among 
the class of doers of fauity doings can be considered a faulty 
doer?62 This is a ques tion of moral merit ,  although not ,  Perry is 
at pains to say, a general one, but one about the moral worth of 
the agent with respect to a particular outcome.63 Furthermore , 
because  the loss has already been incurred , the ques tion is fun-
60.  Perry, sujJra note 9,  a t  935.  
6 1 .  Perry, The .\!oral Foundations vf Tor! Law, supra note 12 ,  a t  69. 
62 .  See id. at  8 2 .  
63 . See id. a t  7 1 . 
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damentally a comparative one: vVho,  from among the (out­
come) responsible parties ,  most deserves to bear it? As Perry 
says : 
The fault requirement is one aspect of a more general com­
parative inquiry: Who among the group comprised of the vic­
tim and those persons who are outcome-responsible for his 
loss should most appropriately suffer the interference with 
well-being that either the original loss or the payment of com­
pensation necessarily entails  ?64 
This i s ,  in essence, a problem of distribution . 
Perry is  surely right to say that the analysis of liabil i ty in tort 
must be a comparative one . In this sense, tort law is fundamen­
tally distinct from criminal law, in which there is no compara­
tive analysis .  The question, in criminal law, is not who of 
several should bear the loss .  The victim ,  after al l ,  will not spend 
ten years in jail if the injurer does not .  In tort , a s  Coleman 
notes ,  " losses always must fal l  on someone," whereas punish­
ment "need not be imposed on anyone. "65 The inquiry in tort 
i s  necessarily comparative because i t  determines who, as be­
tween the injurer and victim, must bear a loss that has already 
been incurred. 
Perry is wrong, however, to think that the inquiry at the sec­
ond s tage is one about moral worth . Indeed, it is the very fact 
that tort la·w is a comparative ins titution that enables it to im­
pose liability without taking into account the moral worth of 
the agent. Although tort law evaluates an agent, this evaluation 
does not involve consideration of the worth of the agent as a 
whole.  The question of tort liability, in other words ,  i s  s till only 
one about fault in the doing. A .. t the end of the firs t s tage, in my 
view, we still have not completed our inquiry into the ques tion 
whether there was fault-in-the-doing. It  is the second stage that 
will establish that. The question whether there was fault-in-the­
doer, by contrast ,  is  never reached in tort .66 This is consis tent 
with the objection I raised above to Perry's treatment of neces-
64 . Perry, supra note 9,  at  936.  
65.  CoLEMAN, supra note 7, at 296. 
56.  Arguably,  criminal law is interes ted in Lml t  in the doer as well as  fault  in the 
doing. Another way to understand the d i fference between ton and criminal law on t:1is 
point i s  to notice that the s tandard of l iabi l i ty  in tort-the reasonableness standard-is 
an o bjective one. The standard of l iabi l i ty in crimina! law, by contras t ,  is  necessarily 
s u bjective. Fault- in-the-doer would appear to involve subjective features that  fault- in­
the-doing would not .  
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sity cases .67 Perry views necessity cases as ones i n  which there is 
fault-in-the-doing, but no fault-in-the-doer. 68 I deny that there 
is fault of any sort in such cases .  
I agree with Perry that, at least in the context of tort  law, the 
category of loss is normatively significant . But I b elieve Perry 
has not realized the full implications of this claim. Take a case 
in which the injurer is  outcome-responsible, but  not at fault, 
and in which the victim i s  neither at fault nor outcome-respon­
sible for his own loss . If the analysis is comparative ,  it would 
seem that the injurer should bear the loss, because  the fact that 
she has caused the loss has some normative significance .  Under 
a comparative analysis ,  the weak presumption in favor of liabil­
ity at the end of the first s tage should be enough to warrant the 
imposi tion of liability in the case in which the victim is  not out­
come-responsible .  After all, why should the victim b ear the loss 
if he lacks , as it were, a normative relation to his loss that the 
injurer has ? 
This conclusion does not square with what Perry says about 
such cases ,  namely, that the victim must continue to bear the 
loss.69 Perry presumably wants to resist the idea that the injurer 
should bear the loss in such cases ,  because in his framework it 
amounts to s trict liability in all cases in which the inj urer is  out­
come responsible . I t  would thus appear to render the fault re­
quirement otiose .  
Perry might reply that the second s tage alone should be com­
parative. But if he treats the first s tage as normative, on what 
grounds can he claim that the second s tage is  comparative if 
the first is not? Indeed, in the next section I shall argue that the 
account is ultimately improved by treating both s tages as 
comparative. 
VI . ToRT LAw AS A CoMPARATIVE INSTITUTION 
The central defining feature of tort law is that it allocates a 
cost that has already been incurred among parties who have 
had varying degrees of involvement in creating it. Fault  can be 
thought of as simply a further degree of involvemen t than c o n ­
tributing causally to a foreseeable outcome; it is not a n  e s s en -
67. See supra text accompanying notes 43- 4 7 .  
68 . See id. 
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tial part o f  the insti tution. Unlike criminal law, the injurer need 
not  be in any particular psychological s tate for i t  to b e  fair to 
impose l iability on her. She mus t only fare worse, I argue,  than 
the victirn in a comparative analysis . 
A comparative approach provides a middle way between a 
system of s trict liability, on the one hand,  and a faul t-based sys­
tem on the other. I t  avoids a fault  s ys tem because it  can impo s e  
liability on t h e  grounds o f  outcome responsibility alone.  The 
way in which i t  avoids a sys tem of strict liability is more 
complicated. 
The comparative analysis would not impo s e  strict liability be­
cause there are two situations in which the inj urer's  outcome 
responsibility would not subject her to liabiiity. First ,  the victim 
may be both outcome-responsible and at fault .  In this cas e ,  the 
weak normative p reference for imposing the cost on an out­
come-responsible inj urer who is not  at  fault would b e  over­
come by the victim's  fault .  Outcome responsibility,  we can say,  
is subordinate to fault.  Secon d ,  the inj urer and victim may both 
b e  outcome-responsible,  but neither may be at  fault .  In that 
case, one might suppose,  responsibility would cancel out,  and 
the inj urer and victim could split th e costs . 70 Alternatively, one 
could adopt the rule that the victim ' s  outcome responsibility 
weighed more heavily than the injurer' s ,  and thus in the case in 
which they were both o utcome-responsible,  the loss would l ie  
where i t  fell .  
If we follow the idea that ton law is  a comparative institution 
to its lo gical conclusion,  then, we achieve the following result .  
The inj urer is s trictly l iable for the reaso nably foreseeable ef­
fects of her voluntary conduct except ( l )  when her victim is at 
fault ;  or (2)  when the loss is  the r-easonably foreseeable result 
of the victim ' s  conduct.  
Fault is  therefore relevant only in the situation where the vic­
tim and the inJ· urer are both ou tcome-resoonsible . In this cas e ,  � 1 
·wh oever is at fault must bear th.:: loss .  If both the inj urer and 
the victim are at fault ,  as in the situation where both are out­
come-responsible and neither is a t  fault ,  a policy decision must 
be mad e .  Either they should split  (or apportion) the costs , or 
the loss should lie where i t  felL The considera tions that might 
i O .  I f  o u t co m e  respons ibi l i t;· c a n  b·� measured in degrees. where both part ies arc 
outcorne-responsiblc and neither is a t  f�nd t .  th�� cus t s  could be L.ipporr ioned according 
i�O degree of invol ·  ..· en1 c n t  insu:-ad of split  cvcnl�� · .  
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be brought to bear to decide b etween these alternatives fal l  
outside the realm of corrective jus tice, and thus they do not 
concern us here. 
Coleman makes reference to, but does not pursue exten­
sively, the idea of establishing liability on the basis of a general 
comparative analysis .  He says "if the fact that one person's  
conduct causes the harm is  a morally relevant feature of the 
s ituation, then, other things b eing equal , the loss should fal l  on 
injurers when it  must fall s trictly on someone. "7 1 Coleman ar­
gues that against the background of this assumption (that i s ,  if 
we affirm the antecedent of his conditional ) ,  s trict  liability is 
preferable to fault ,  precisely because a fault s tandard holds vic­
tims liable under circumstances in which they have not  contrib­
uted causally to their own injury , but in which the inj urer has . 72 
A fault sys tem is ,  in effect, strict victim liability. S trict inj urer 
l iability would be preferable to s trict victim liability on this as­
sumption, because,  as Coleman explains ,  "under s trict injurer 
liability , faultless injurers are liable only if they cause harm, 
whereas under fault liability, faultless victims can b e  held liable 
whether or not they cause harm. "73 Coleman ultimately , how­
ever, appears to rej ect the idea that causation has normative 
significance .  74 
My analysis would result in roughly the following series of 
conditionals :  ( l )  If  the injurer is  at fault ,  then she i s  liable un­
less the victim is  at fault (assuming both are outcome-responsi­
ble) . In the latter case ,  they should either split (or apportion) 
the costs ,  or let the loss lie where i t  falls . (2) If the inj urer is  not 
a t  fault ,  and the victim is  not outcome-responsible ,  then , if the 
injurer is  outcome-responsible, she is liable. If the victim is out­
come-responsible also ,  then either they should split the costs , 
or let  the loss lie where it falls . If we omit the case in which 
agents are at fault but not outcome-responsible (which is not an 
interesting one for our purposes ,  because outcome responsibil­
ity is a necessary condition for liabil i ty) , there are nine possible 
cases . vVe can summarize them with the following matrix .  
7 1 .  CoLEMAN, supra note 7 ,  a t  3 0  l .  
7'2 . See id. 
73.  !d. at 3 0 2 .  
7 4 .  See id. a t  3 7 7-79.  
1 
i 
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INJURER 
No Outcome 
Involvement ResEonsible Faul t  75 
( 1 )  (2) (3) 
No Let loss Injurer liable Injurer liable 
v Involvement lie 
I 
c (4) (5) (6) 
T Outcome Let loss Split  costs Injurer liable 
I ResEonsible lie (or let loss lie) 
M 
(7) (8) (9) 
Fault Let loss Let loss lie Split costs 
lie (or let loss lie) 
In the three boxes that lie on the diagonal , ( 1 ) ,  (5) , and (9) , 
policy decisions must be made .  When there are no normative 
preferences from the standpoint of corrective justice, there are 
various possibilities .  In cases where the injurer is at least out­
come-responsible, the injurer and the victim can split (or ap­
portion, depending on the degree of involvement) the costs .  
This option should not be available in box ( 1 ) , however, be­
cause the injurer bears no responsibihty at all;  the agency con­
di tion has not been satisfied.  Unlike fault ,  outcome 
responsibility is a necessary condition for burdening an agent 
with the duty to compensate, at least where the duty is  to be  
jus tified b y  corrective j u s tice . 
There is a ready solution to necessity cases on the account I 
have presented . In necessity case s ,  the inj urer is outcome-re­
sponsible but not at fault .  The victim is neither outcome - re­
sponsible nor at fault. This would place the case in box (2)  of 
our matrix, which seems right .  As benveen Hal and Carla ,  be­
cause Hal bears a normatively significant relation to the loss 
that  Carla lacks , it  is  preferable that he rather than she be bur­
dened with the loss .  In the case in which Carla is  outcome­
responsible for the loss as well (box (5) ) ,  as she vvould be if she 
left the insulin lying on a table in a public library and Hal took 
it  in a necessitous s tate, their responsibilities would cancel out, 
and Hal would not be required to compensate Carla . Al terna­
tively , they could split  the costs . 
According to my understanding o f  fault  in the doing versus 
7 5 .  The heading ' fau l t "  presupposes o u tcome responsibi l i tY .  
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fault in the doer, 76 the resolution o f  necessity cases can b e  ex­
plained by saying that Hal ' s  behavior does not even amount to 
fault in the doing. The duty to pay compensation must ,  then, 
be a pre-moral duty of sorts . Hal's conduct is not faulty ,  but he 
must compensate Caria simply because he causally contributed 
to a reasonably foreseeable loss which i t  would be unfair to im- . 
pose on anyone else .  Cases where excuses and jus tifications are 
invoked, according to this model,  are ones in which a weak nor­
mative duty requires that the injurer pay compensation .  They 
are not cases ,  however, in which a moral duty (in the s trict 
sense) obtains , in that there is no fault in the doing. 
One advantage my modification of the wrongful loss require­
ment has over Perry' s  is  that it explains why courts do not treat 
self-defense in the same way that they treat necessity cases .  
Suppose Sam hits Carole and claims he was acting in self-de­
fense.  A claim of self-defense is valid only when the person in­
voking the defense can reasonably claim that his attacker was in 
the wrong.77 This would place the case in box (8)  of the matrix, 
because Carole (the victim in this case) is at fault, and this pre­
dominates over the fact that Sam (the injurer) is outcome-re­
sponsible for injuring Carole.  If Carole is at fault ,  and Sam is 
not at fault , although both Sam and Carole are outcome-re­
sponsible, Sam is not liable for Carole 's  injuries . 
Notice that in the case in which Carole (s till "victim") herself 
has a justification for having initiated the attack (say, for exam­
ple, that Sam is breaking into Carole's home, where the general 
duty to retreat does not apply) , 78 then Sam cannot claim self­
defense when he responds to Carole' s  attack. 79 In that case,  
Carole is not at faul t , and thus Sam cannot claim that  his behav­
ior is excused. Sam (" injurer")  is now at fault and Carole is not .  
The case would fall into box (6) because the injurer is now truly 
at fault  and the victim is merely outcome-responsible. 
By contrast, we cannot reach this result on Perry ' s  accou n t .  
This is because Perry labeis the behavior of an agen t actmg 
7 6 .  See supra text  accompanying notes 4 3 - 4 7 .  
7 7 .  See W .  PAGE K E ETON E T  A L. ,  PRossER MiD KEETON ON THE L A W  o :c  ToRTS § 1 9  
(5th ed . 1 984) .  
7 8 .  See ld. 
7 9 .  Tort law is for the most  part in accord with the cri minal law on this  point .  See 
;\10DEL PENAL CoDE, § 3 . 04 (2 ) (a ) ( i i ) . The MPC provides,  however, for a n  exception 
when "the actor bel ieves that such force i s  necessary to protect himself a gainst  death or· 
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under a claim of necessity " fault-like" in order to bring the 
agent's conduct within the ambit of corrective justice . The label 
attaches because the behavior is intentional. But by this logic, 
an agent acting  in self-defense is liable in corrective justice as 
well. 
One addition to my account  is needed to cover the range of 
cases we have been discussing. Consider, again, the hypotheti­
cal Perry used to criticize Coleman's theory.80 According to a 
comparative analysis , it might appear to be the case that B is 
l iable , although not at fault. B is outcome-responsible for C ' s  
loss ,  and a s  between B and C, the comparative analysis would 
appear to require that B should bear the loss .  There is a solu­
tion, however: The relevant comparison is not between B and 
C, but between B and A .  A is both outcome-responsible and at 
fault .  A ' s fault, then, should predominate over B ' s  outcome re­
spons ibility. This case underscores the way in which fault over­
whelms the weak ethical duty to compensate victims on the 
basis of mere outcome responsibility . In the absence of fault ,  
the comparative analysis has normative preferences that it does 
not h ave where one of the parties in question i s  at fault. Were B 
acting alone, the comparative analysis would dictate liability. 
But A 's fault, in the case in which they act together, relieves B 
of liability if B i s  not at fault. 
·where does the compartive approach leave us with respect to 
Coleman's  two conditions? I agree with Perry that the first con­
dition, the agency requirement,  should be understood along 
the lines of outcome responsibility .  The account of respons ibil­
i ty Coleman offers is unacceptable, I have argued, because of 
the problem posed by necessity cases. The second condition ,  
·wrongful los s ,  should be  modified. 1 t  should not , however, be 
chan ged to a fault requirement, as Perry suggests .  Rather, the 
notion of "wrongful loss"  should be understood as a compara­
tive concept. A loss is  "wrongful" when there exists , from 
among the outcome-responsible agen ts ,  at  !east one agent 
whose conduct implicates her more than the victim is implicated 
on the basis of his conduct .  This proposal  does not ignore the 
:ole fault plays in many of o u r  j udgments of culpabil ity .  But i t  
does posit  that fault  is neither a necessary nor a sufficient con-
SU.  Perr;:. s1 1pm note 9,  a t  922-23 .  Sre a!Jo sujJra t e x t  accompanving notes  34 - 4 1 .  
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I have argued that the central problem with Perry' s  account 
is that it makes fault a necessary condition of liability in tort, 
and that this move precludes a satisfactory account of necessity 
cases .  I have therefore argued that Coleman should resist the 
invitation to meet Perry's  criticism by introducing a fault condi­
tion into the wrongful loss requirement. Coleman' s  incorpora­
tion of a fault condition into his account of responsibility is  
problematic for the same reason. I have argued that his  attempt 
to work around this difficulty does not resolve the problem. 
In place of Perry 's  suggestion, I have proposed a modifica­
tion of the wrongful  loss requirement which I b elieve satisfac­
torily meets the difficulty that Perry signals :  It explains 
necessi ty cases without eliminating the role fault plays in other 
kinds of cases ,  thus permitting fault to be the prevailing consid­
eration in cases in which more than one agent i s  outcome-re­
sponsible but not all are at fault .  The mis taken assumption 
behind Perry's sugges tion is that if outcome responsibility 
grounds a duty to compensate in some cases-such as necessity 
cases-it must do so  in all cases . I have tried to show that be­
cause of the comparative nature of tort law, this assumption is  
unwarranted . 
Tort law is not, for the most part , primarily a moral institu­
tion, as is criminal law, although where fault is relevant to lia­
bility tort law employs rnoral norms .  Nor is tort law primarily 
an economic institution, al though by imposing the loss on the 
party with the greatest degree of involvement it  happens to cre­
ate incentives for etficient behavior. Tort law appears to s tart 
from different premises altogether, premises that are neither 
fundamentally psychological nor consequentiali s t .  I t  is con­
cerned with distributing losses on the basis of degrees of in­
volvement, not because "degree of involvement"  serves as a 
proxy for something else, such as culpability or cheapest cost 
8 1 .  My s u gges tion is i n tended to supplement,  not to replace,  Colem a n ' s  wrongfu l  
l o s s  requirement. The compa rat ive analvsis  would a p p l y  w '.vrongs-rights i nvas i o n s ,  
whether perm is s ible or impc:rrnissibie-and wrongdoings-imperm i s s ible setbacks to 
legitimate i nterest s .  St'P su,om text accompanying notes 29-3 1 .  In other words,  the com­
parative analysis does not apply to i l legitimate i n terests,  : ;uch as a thief"s  i n terest i n  
stolen g o o d s ,  o r  t o  permissible set backs to lcgi t i r�'la te  interests ,  such as revenue loss  
because o f  bus iness  competi c i o n .  
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avoider. Involvement in bringing about a loss,  where certain 
types of protected interests are concerned, is  normatively sig­
nificant in its own right .  A system of liability can therefore flow 
directly from it .  
